In this second part of our two-part paper, we invoke the stochastic maximum principle, conditional
I. INTRODUCTION
In the first part [1] of this two part paper, we have derived team and person-by-person optimality conditions for distributed stochastic differential systems with noiseless decentralized information structures. Specifically, we considered distributed (coupled) stochastic differential equations of Itô form driven by Brownian motions, and decision makers acting on decentralized noiseless i) nonanticipative and ii) feedback information structures, and we have shown existence of team and person-by-person optimal strategies utilizing relaxed and regular strategies. Then we applied tools from the classical theory of stochastic optimization with some variations to derive team and person-by-person optimality conditions [2] - [5] .
The first important concussions drawn from [1] is that the classical theory of stochastic optimization is not limited in mathematical concepts and procedures by the centralized assumption based upon which it is developed. It is directly applicable to differential systems consisting of multiple decision makers, in which the acquisition of information and its processing is decentralized or shared among several locations, while the decision makers actions are based on different information structures. The second important conclusion drawn from [1] is that team and person-by-person optimality conditions are given by a Hamiltonian system of equations consisting of a conditional Hamiltonian, and coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations.
The work in [1] compliments the current body of knowledge on static team game theory [6] - [10] , and decentralized decision making [9] - [20] , and more recent work in [21] - [26] , by introducing optimility conditions for general stochastic nonlinear differential systems.
The main remaining challenge is to determine whether under the formulation and assumptions introduced in [1] , we can derive optimal decentralized strategies for nonlinear and linear distributed stochastic differential systems, understand the computational complexity of these strategies compared to centralized strategies, and determine how this complexity can be reduced by allowing limited signaling among the different decision makers.
Therefore, in this second part of the two-part investigation, we apply the optimality conditions derived in the first part to a variety of linear and nonlinear distributed stochastic differential systems with decentralized noiseless information structures to derive optimal strategies. Our investigation leads to the following conclusions. 1) When the dynamics are linear in the decision variables and nonlinear in the state variables, and the pay-off is quadratic in the decision variable and nonlinear in the state variable, the optimal decentralized strategies are given in terms of conditional expectations with respect to the information structure on which they act on;
2) When the dynamics are linear in the state and the decision variables, and the pay-off is quadratic in the state and the decision variables, then the optimal decentralized strategies are computed in closed form, much as in the classical Linear-Quadratic Theory. However, when the pay-off includes coupling between the decision makes the optimal strategy of any player is also a function of the average value of the optimal strategies of the other players.
3) The computation of the optimal strategies involves the solution of certain equations, which can be formulated and solved via fixed point methods.
4) The computation complexity of the optimal decentralized strategies can be reduced by signaling specific information among the decision makers and/or by considering certain structure for the distributed system and pay-off.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the distributed stochastic system with decentralized information structures and the main assumption, and we state the optimality conditions derived in [1] . In Section III, we apply to optimality conditions to several forms of team games, and we show how the optimal decentralized strategies are computed. For the case of linear differential dynamics and quadratic pay-off we obtain explicit expressions of the optimal decentralized team strategies. The paper is concluded with some comments on possible extensions of our results.
II. TEAM AND PERSON-BY-PERSON OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
In this section we introduce the mathematical formulation of distributed stochastic systems with decentralized noiseless information structures, and the optimality conditions derived in [1] .
The formulation in [1] presupposes a fixed probability space with filtration, Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P satisfying the usual conditions, that is, (Ω, F, P) is complete, F 0,0 contains all P-null sets in F. All σ−algebras are assumed complete and right continuous, that is, F 0,t = F 0,t+ △ = s>t F 0,s , ∀t ∈ [0, T ). We use the notation F T △ = {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} and similarly for the rest of the filtrations. February 15, 2013 DRAFT
The minimum principle in [1] is derived utilizing the following spaces. Let L
(Ω, R n )) denote the space of F T −adapted random processes {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
which is a sub-Hilbert space of
) denote the space of F T −adapted n × m matrix valued random processes {Σ(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
tr(Σ * (t)Σ(t))dt < ∞.
A. Distributed Stochastic Differential Decision Systems
A stochastic differential decision or control system is called distributed if it consists of an interconnection of at least two subsystems and decision makers, whose actions are based on decentralized information structures. The underlying assumption is that the decision makers are allowed to exchange information on their law or strategy deployed, but not their actions.
Let Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P denote a fixed complete filtered probability space on which we shall define all processes. At this state we do not specify how {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} came about, but we require that Brownian motions are adapted to this filtration.
Admissible Decision Maker Strategies
The Decision Makers (DM) {u i : i ∈ Z N } take values in a closed convex subset of metric spaces
The admissible set of regular strategies is defined by
. . , N, and u i :
Distributed Stochastic Systems
On the probability space Ω, F, {F 0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, P the distributed stochastic system consists of an interconnection of N subsystems, and each subsystem i has, state space R n i , action space 
an R m i -valued standard Brownian motion which models the exogenous state noise, adapted to F T , independent of x i (0); Each subsystem is described by coupled stochastic differential equations of Itô type as follows.
Define the augmented vectors by
The distributed system is described in compact form by
where
the diffusion coefficients.
Pay-off Functional
Given a u ∈ U (N ) reg [0, T ] and (2) we define the reward or performance criterion by
denotes the running cost function and ϕ : R n −→ (−∞, ∞], the terminal cost function.
B. Team and Person-by-Person Optimality
In this section we give the precise definitions of team and person-by-person optimality for regular strategies.
Problem 1. (Team Optimality) Given the pay-off functional (4), constraint (3) the N tuple of
strategies u o △ = (u 1,o , u 2,o , . . . , u N,o ) ∈ U (N ) reg [0, T ]
is called nonanticipative team optimal if it satisfies
Any (7) is called an optimal decision strategy (or control) and the corresponding 
An alternative approach to handle such problems with decentralized information structures is to restrict the definition of optimality to the so-called person-by-person equilibrium.
Problem 2. (Person-by-Person Optimality) Given the pay-off functional (4), constraint (3) the
Similarly, feedback person-by-person optimal strategies are defined with respect to
Conditions (8) are analogous to the Nash equilibrium strategies of team games consisting of a single pay-off and N DM. The person-by-person optimal strategy states that none of the N DM with different information structures can deviate unilaterally from the optimal strategy and gain by doing so.
C. Team and Person-by-Person Optimality Conditions
In this section we first introduce the assumptions on {f, σ, h, ℓ, ϕ} and then we state the optimality conditions derived in [1] .
denote the space of F T -adapted R n valued second order random processes endowed with the norm topology · defined by
The main assumptions are stated below.
Assumptions 1. (Main assumptions)
U i is closed and convex subset of R d i , ∀i ∈ Z N , E|x(0)| R n < ∞ and the maps of {f, σ, ℓ, ϕ} satisfy the following conditions.
and continously differentiable with respect to x, u;
is continuous in (t, x, u) and continously differentiable with respect to x, u;
is continously differentiable with respect to x, ℓ(0, 0, t) is bounded, and there exist (1) System (3) has a unique solution
The solution of system (3) is continuously dependent on the control, in the sense that,
These statements also hold for feedback strategies u ∈ U
Proof: Proof is identical to that of [4] .
Note that the differentiability of f, σ, ℓ with respect to u can be removed without affecting the results (by considering either needle variations when deriving the maximum principle or by deriving the maximum principle for relaxed strategies and then specializing it to regular strategies as in [1] ).
Assumptions 1 are used to derive optimality conditions for stochastic control problems with nonanticipative centralized strategies. However, for stochastic control problems with feedback centralized strategies additional assumptions are required to avoid certain technicalities associated with the derivation of the maximum principle. In [1] we identified these assumptions for decentralized randomized feedback strategies; the main theorems are stated below.
Assumptions 2. The following holds.
(E1) The diffusion coefficients σ is restricted to the map σ :
it is independent of u) and σ(·, ·) and σ −1 (·, ·) are bounded.
Define the σ−algebras
T −adapted there exists a function φ i (·) measurable to a sub-σ−algebra of
Define all such adapted nonanticipative functions by
Next, we introduce the following additional assumptions.
Assumptions 3.
The following hold.
Under Assumptions 1 it can be shown that J(·) is continuous in the sense of U 
Proof: We follow the procedure in [28] . For any
. Let x k (·) denote the trajectory corresponding to u k,· , and
and
Since
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From the above equations it follows that (13) also holds for k ≤ t ≤ 2k, and by induction that F 
Utilizing Assumptions 1 we can show that E sup s∈[0,t] |x α (s) − x(s)| R n converges to zero as
By the mean value theorem we have the following inequality.
Thus, under the assumptions of Theorem 1 if
then it is also optimal with respect to U (N )
Consequently, the necessary conditions for feedback information structures u ∈ U (N ),z u reg [0, T ] to be optimal are those for which nonanticipative information structures u ∈ U (N )
In the next remark we give an example for which Assumptions 2 hold, and hence Theorem 1 is valid.
Remark 1. Suppose x
1 and x 2 are governed by the following stochastic differential equations
If we further assume that σ i (·, ·), σ i,−1 (·, ·) are bounded, and Assumptions 1 hold, then F
for which (E2) holds, and thus Theorem 1 is valid.
Next, we state the main theorem which gives necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for nonanticipative and feedback decisions.
Define the Hamiltonian
For any u ∈ U (N )
satisfies the following backward stochastic differential equation
x is the derivative of σ (k) with respect to the state, for k = 1, 2, . . . , m, Q (k) is the kth column of Q).
The state process satisfies the stochastic differential equation
The main theorem is stated below.
Theorem 2. (Team optimality) Consider Problem 1 under Assumptions 1, and assume existence
of an optimal team strategy.
(I) Suppose F T is the filtration generated by x(0) and the Brownian motion
to be team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold.
(1) There exists a semi martingale with the intensity process
The variational inequality is satisfied:
solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (19) , (20) , such that
satisfies the point wise almost sure inequalities with respect to the σ-algebras Suppose the following conditions hold. (24) .
(II) Suppose F T is the filtration generated by x(0) and the Brownian motion {W (t) : t ∈ 
Proof: See [29] .
Next, we have the following corollary regarding person-by-person optimality. 
Corollary 1. (Person-by-person optimality) Consider Problem 2 under the conditions of Theorem 2. Then the necessary and sufficient condition of Theorem 2 hold with variational inequality
It can be shown by contradiction that the team and person-by-person optimality conditions presented above are equivalent (see [1] ).
Often in the application of the minimum principle we need to identify the the martingale term in the adjoint process equation. One approach how to determine Q is discussed in the next remark.
Remark 2. Utilizing the Riesz representation theorem for Hilbert space martingles, in [1] the
adjoint process Q(·) in the adjoint equation (19) , is identified as
provided ψ x exists (i.e., f, σ, ℓ, ϕ are twice continuously differentiable and f xx , σ xx , ℓ xx , ϕ xx are uniformly bounded).
Note that from the team optimality conditions presented above we also deduce the optimality conditions for centralized full and partial information strategies. This observation is stated in the next remark (for partial information strategies) 
} are the solutions of the Hamiltonian system (21) , (22), (19) , (20) , while for G T . This corresponds to the partial information investigated in [4] .
III. OPTIMAL TEAM STRATEGIES FOR CLASSES OF GAMES
We are now ready to derive explicit optimal team strategies for general classes of team games, when the dynamics and the reward have certain structures. These include nonlinear as well as linear distributed systems. Our focus is on optimal decentralized strategies which are given in a) closed form involving conditional expectations based on the information structures available to the DM's and b) closed expressions similar to the classical Linear-Quadratic Theory.
First, we define the main classes of team games we shall investigate.
Definition 1. (Team games with special structures) We define the following forms of team games.
(GNF): Generalized Normal Form. The team game is said to have "generalized normal form"
where u, R(t, x)u (28) .
SGNF refers to the case when f is linear in u, σ is independent of u, ℓ is quadratic in u, and f, σ, ℓ are nonlinear in x.
(NF): Normal Form. A team game is said to have "normal form" if
and NF refers to the case when f, σ are linear is x, u, and ℓ, ϕ are quadratic in x, u. Therefore, the dynamics also include stochastic integral terms which are linear is x, u. 
(LQF): Linear-Quadratic Form. A team game is said to have "normal form" if
f (t, x, u) =A(t)x + B(t)u, σ(t, x, u) = G(t),(34)ℓ(t, x) = 1 2 u, R(t)u + 1 2 x, H(t)x , ϕ(x) = 1 2 x, M(T )x ,(35)
Case GNF.
Utilizing the definition of Hamiltonian (18) , its derivative is given by 
Define the quantities
By Theorem 2, substituting Q o (·) given by (38) into (36), and utilizing the fact that u
t is obtained from (24) , and it is given by
Next, we make some observations.
is a functional of estimates of all other optimal decisions u j,o t , j = i given its own information. Such strategies impose a heavy computational burden on any decentralized decision maker. Therefore, a question which might be of interest to address, is "what information needs to be signal among the DM's to reduce computations?" The answer to this question will become apparent when we proceed to compute the explicit expressions of the optimal strategies. Finally, note that the optimal strategies can be further simplified by assuming g(t, x) is linear in x and σ(t, ·, u) is linear in x, R(·, ·) is independent of x, λ(·, ·) is quadratic in x, and η(·, ·)
is linear in x.
Case SNF.
For a team game of simplified generalized form, the diffusion coefficient σ is independent of u, therefore the second right hand side term of (36) is zero (since s i = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , m), and the derivative of the Hamiltonian is linear in u. Therefore, the explicit expressions for u i,o are obtained from (39) by setting
By comparing the optimal strategies for GNF given by (39) and (40) 
. . , N, and each channel is subject to feedback and interference from the other channels. Then each channel outputs can be described by
Thus, {x i (t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T } describes the channel output of the ith receiver which is subject to feedback and interference from the other channels, θ i is the message to be estimated at the ith receiver, and u 
One may consider several other scenarios of distributed estimation by considering specific pay-off function ℓ(t, x, u) which represents estimation error.
Case NF.
For a team game of normal form define the quantities
. . .
Then from the optimal strategies under GNF one
Another important observations is the following.
(O5): The expressions of the optimal team strategies can be written in a fixed point form.
This is described next for the case LQF.
Case LQF with E = 0, m = 0.
For a team game of linear-quadratic form (with E, m non-zero) then from the previous optimal strategies one obtains
Note that (44) can be put in the form of fixed point matrix equation with random coefficients as follows. Define
Taking expectation of both sides of (44) with respect to G i 0,t then (44) is written in terms of linear equation with random coefficients as follows.
Clearly, (47) can be solved via fixed point methods, provided we determine the estimates
In the next subsection we determine the estimate x o (t), and also show that ψ o (t)
can be expressed in terms of the estimates x o (t), u o (t).
We conclude this section by observing that the optimal team strategies involve conditional expectations with respect to the DMs information structures. These conditional expectations can be simplified considerably by allowing signaling between the different DMs.
A. Team Games of Normal Form: Explicit Expressions of Adjoint Processes
In this section we concentrate on Normal Form (and Linear-Quadratic Form) games, and we derive explicit expressions for the adjoint processes of
Note that this is a necessary step before one proceeds with the computation of the explicit form of the optimal decentralized strategies, or the computation of them via fixed point methods as in (47).
For a game of Normal Form the Hamiltonian system of equations are the following.
where σ is given by (31) . The derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to u is
Let
) denote the solutions of the Hamiltonian system, corresponding to the optimal control u o , then (51), is given by
Since for any control policy, {x o (s) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T } is uniquely determined from (50) and its current value x o (t), then (53) can be expressed via
where Σ(·), β o (·) determine the operators to the one expressed via (53).
Next, we determine the operators (Σ(·), β o (·)). Differentiating both sides of (54) and using (50),
yields
By matching the intensity of the martingale terms {·}dW (t) in (55) we obtain
and by (52) we also obtain
Clearly, Q o given by (56) is precisely the one predicted by Remark 2.
Substituting the claimed relation (54) into (55) we obtained the identity
Therefore, from (58), (56) we deducė
The closed form expressions of the adjoint processes (ψ o (·), Q o (·)) of this section are required in order to explicitly compute the closed form expression of the optimal decentralized strategies or apply fixed point methods via (47) (in addition to solving centralized problems).
Next we find the optimal strategy assuming centralized information structure for each DM, and then we determine the optimal strategies assuming decentralized information structures for each DM. The reason we pursue centralized strategies is to gain additional insight into its differences when compared to decentralized strategies, both in the procedure and the amount of complexity involved in implementing centralized versus decentralized strategies.
B. Centralized Information Structure: NF and LQF
First, we consider a centralized information structure and we compute the optimal strategy for team games of Normal and Linear-Quadratic forms. For any t ∈ [0, T ] the information structure G
is available to all DMs and it is the σ−algebra G
. , x N (s)) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} (we assume a strong formulation so the information depends on u). If instead, we consider nonanticipative centralized information structure
then the final results are the same. This is a common (centralized) full information structure decision strategy hence, the optimal decision
) are solutions of the Hamiltonian system (50), (51) corresponding to
) are given by (54) and (56), respectively, all we need to do is to determine
We show the following claims.
LQF. When the system dynamics and pay-off are of Linear-Quadratic Form, the optimal centralized strategy is given by
where the operator K(t) ∈ L(R n , R n ) is the symmetric positive semidefinite solution of the differential equatioṅ
NF with E = 0. When the system dynamics and pay-off are of Normal Form (with E = 0), the optimal centralized strategy is given by
where the operator K(t) ∈ L(R n , R n ) is symmetric positive semidefinite, and r(t) ∈ R n , and they are solutions of the differential equationṡ
Next, we verify the claim stated under LQF and we leave the claim stated under NF to the reader since its derivation is similar.
Derivation of LQF Solution. From (61) the optimal strategy is
) denote the solutions of the following Hamiltonian system, correspond-
Then {ψ o (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is given by (53) with F = 0, E = 0, hence
For any admissible decision u and corresponding (x(·), ψ(·)) define their filtered versions by
and their predicted versions by
From (70) the optimal strategy is
Taking conditional expectations on both sides of (74) with respect to G
where we utilized the fact that
The predictor version of x o (·) is obtained from (71) utilizing the fact that the last right hand side of this equation is a stochastic integral with respect to Brownian motion, hence
Since for any policy and hence for the optimal
determined from (77) and the current value
where K(·) determines the operator to the one expressed via (76). Substituting (79) into (75) we obtain (62). Let
and recall that the identities
Next, we determine K(·). Substituting the solution of (77), (78), specifically,
and thus K(·) is identified by the operator
Differentiating both sides of (81) yields the following differential equation for K(·).
Using (81) in the previous equations we obtain the matrix differential equation (63), (64).
An alternative approach is to utilize (54), (59), (60) (with κ i , b, F, E, s i = 0) which implies
Then replace u o (·) in (83) by (75) and take conditional expectation to obtain
Next, assume ψ o (t) = K(t)x(t), for some K(·), and then substitute this in (84) to obtain
By utilizing the equation for Σ(·) it can be shown that (85) is a solution of (63), (64).
The previous calculations demonstrate how to compute the optimal strategy when both decision variables are based on centralized information structures, and its is precisely the optimal strategy obtained via variety of other methods in the literature.
Note that certain computations presented above are also required to compute an expression for the estimate ψ o (t) entering the fixed point equation (47).
Finally, one can verify that the necessary conditions of optimality of Theorem 2 utilized to derive the above optimal strategy are also sufficient. Specifically, in view of Theorem 2 it suffices to show convexity of ϕ(x) = 1 2
x, M(T )x + x, N(T ) and joint convexity of the Hamiltonian
C. Decentralized Information Structures for LQF
In this section we invoke the minimum principle to compute the optimal strategies for team games of Linear-Quadratic Form. We consider decentralized strategies based on 1) nonanticipative information structures, and 2) feedback information structures. Without loss of generality we assume the distributed stochastic dynamical decision systems consists of an interconnection of two subsystems, each governed by a linear stochastic differential equation with coupling. The generalizations to an arbitrary number of interconnected subsystems will be given as a corollary.
Consider the distributed dynamics described below.
Subsystem Dynamics 1:
Subsystem Dynamics 2:
For any t ∈ [0, T ] the information structure of u 1 t of subsystem 1 is the σ−algebra G 1 0,t , and information structure of u 2 t of subsystem 2 is the σ−algebra G 2 0,t . These information structures are defined shortly.
Pay-off Functional:
We assume that the initial condition x(0), the system Brownian motion {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, and the observations Brownian motion {B 1 (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, and {B 2 (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are mutually independent and x(0) is Gaussian (E(x(0)), Cov(x(0))) = (x 0 , P 0 ).
Define the augmented variables by
and matrices by
) denote the solutions of the Hamiltonian system, corresponding to the optimal control u o , then
where Σ(·), β o (·) are given by (59), (60) 
From (93), (94) the optimal decisions are
From the previous expressions we notice the following. Let φ(·) be any square integrable and F T −adapted matrix-valued process or scalar-valued processes, and define its filtered and predictor versions by
For any admissible decision u and corresponding (x(·), ψ(·)) define their filter versions with respect to G i 0,t for i = 1, 2, by
From (95), (96) the optimal decisions are
The previous optimal decisions require the conditional estimates
These are obtained by taking conditional expectations of (74) giving
Before we proceed further we shall specify the information structures available to the DMs.
Nonanticipative Information Structures. The information structure available to
0,t , and the information structure available to u 2 is G 2 0,t
0,t . Therefore, by denoting π w i (·)(·) the conditional expectation with respect to
, for any admissible decision, the filtered versions of x(·) based on this information structures are given by the following stochastic differential equations [30] (Theorem 8.2).
From the previous filtered versions of x(·) it is clear that subsystem 1 estimates the augmented state vector and the actions of subsystem 2 based on its own observations, namely, π
and subsystem 2 estimates the augmented state vector and the actions of subsystem 1 based on its own observations, namely, π w 2 (u 1 )(·).
For any admissible decision u the predicted versions of x(·) are obtained from (100) and (101) as follows. Utilizing the identity π
Since for a given admissible policy and observation paths, {π w 1 (x)(s, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T } is determined from (102) and its current value π w 1 (x o )(t, t) = π w 1 (x)(t), and {π w 2 (x)(s, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T } is determined from (104), and its current value π w 2 (x)(t, t) = π w 2 (x)(t), then (99) can be expressed via
where K i (·), r i (·) determines the operators to the one expressed via (99), for i = 1, 2. Utilizing (106) into (97) and (98) then
Substituting the previous equations into (102), (103) and (104), (105) then 
Utilizing the last observation we show in the next main theorem that the optimal DM strategies are finite dimensional (i.e., given in terms of finite number of statistics), and that each optimal strategy is linear function of the augmented state estimate based on his information, and the average value of the other optimal strategy. The computation of the average optimal strategies can be expressed in fixed point form.
Theorem 3. (Optimal decentralized strategies for LQF)
Given a LQF game the optimal decisions (u 1,o , u 2,o ) are given
satisfy the linear non-homogeneous stochastic differential equations
and 
Substituting (121), (122) into (109), (110), and then (109), (110) into (99) we have The last two equations can be written in matrix form (120). This completes the derivation.
Hence, the optimal strategies are computed from (111), (112), where the filter equations for 
The optimal strategies are obvious extensions of the ones given in Theorem 3. [31] - [33] .
Simplifications. Several simpler forms can be deduced from the results of Theorem 3 by as-
Signaling. Given the optimal decentralized strategies of Theorem 3 we can determine the amount of signaling among the DMs to reduce the computational complexity of the optimal strategies.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this second part of our two-part paper, we invoke the stochastic maximum principle, conditional Hamiltonian and the coupled backward-forward stochastic differential equations of the first part [1] to derive team optimal decentralized strategies for distributed stochastic differential systems with noiseless information structures. We present examples of such team games of nonlinear as well as linear quadratic forms. In some cases we obtain closed form expressions of the optimal decentralized strategies.
The methodology is very general, and applicable to several types of information structures such as the ones described under Remark 4. It will be interesting to consider additional types of information structures and compute the optimal decentralized strategies in closed form, to better understand the implications of signaling and computational complexity of such strategies compared to centralized strategies.
